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Consider the case of Ranbaxy Laboratories, the Indianpharmaceutical firm. Like many of its peers fromemerging markets, Ranbaxy did not generate any
revenues from developed markets until 1989. By 2006,
however, the firm earned 60% of its revenues from devel-
oped markets and had completed nine cross-border acquisi-
tions in such markets. Ranbaxy’s international growth in
developed markets is hardly an isolated case; rather, it is
part of a more widespread phenomenon. Taking note of the
phenomenal growth of emerging-market firms in developed
markets, The Economist (2010, p. 7) observes that “many of
the developing world’s champions have risen from zero to
hero in just a couple of decades.”
Only a few firms, however, account for a significant
proportion of the international growth of emerging markets
in developed markets. For example, between 1999 and
2008, only 7.82% of publicly traded firms from major
emerging markets were involved in cross-border acquisi-
tions in developed markets (Rabbiosi, Elia, and Bertoni
2012). The overall revenues from developed markets
among emerging-market firms are similarly lopsided, with
only a few firms showing significant international growth
in developed markets. These figures raise the following
research question: Why do some emerging-market firms
achieve more revenue growth in developed markets than
others?
The question of how firms grow is arguably one of the
most important issues facing the marketing discipline
(Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993; Srivastava, Sher-
vani, and Fahey 1998). With the globalization of markets,
the international aspects of such growth are of increasing
importance to academics and managers alike (Steenkamp
2005). Although substantial work examines the interna-
tional growth of firms from developed countries into
emerging markets, little research investigates the interna-
tional growth of firms from emerging countries into devel-
oped markets (Burgess and Steenkamp 2006; Gielens and
Dekimpe 2007). The Marketing Science Institute has
observed this gap and, in establishing its research priorities
for 2010–2012, stressed the need to understand the opportu-
nities and threats posed by the international growth of
emerging-market firms.
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The existing literature on the international growth of
firms has suggested that a major driver of such growth is
firms’ knowledge about how to compete in foreign markets
(Barkema and Drogendijk 2007; Johanson and Vahlne
1977). An influential stream of research based on the inter-
national growth of developed-market firms has argued that
these firms learn how to compete in foreign markets incre-
mentally through direct experience of foreign markets,
which they accumulate over time (Barkema and Drogendijk
2007; Johanson and Vahlne 1977). However, this argument
is unlikely to hold for the international growth of emerging-
market firms in developed markets, because the context that
emerging-market firms faced when they internationalized
was very different from that which developed market firms
encountered during internationalization. In general, interna-
tionalization occurred much later and in a more compressed
time period in emerging than in developed markets. As a
result, the opportunity for emerging-market firms to learn
directly from their own experience and incrementally was
lacking relative to developed-market firms. How, then, did
some emerging-market firms learn how to compete in
developed markets in harsher competitive conditions and in
a much shorter time frame? We argue that, in contrast to
their developed-market counterparts, which learned directly
from their own experience, emerging-market firms learned
indirectly about how to compete in developed markets by
acquiring this knowledge from three types of entities: lead-
ers, competitors, and other firms in their networks.
By studying the international growth of emerging mar-
ket firms in developed markets, we aim to make three con-
tributions. First, we respond to recent calls by eminent mar-
keting scholars for more research on emerging markets (Gu,
Hung, and Tse 2008; Sheth 2011). As Sheth (2011, p. 180)
states, “Research on emerging markets is not just a ‘nice
thing to do’; it is increasingly becoming a necessity.”
Within the context of emerging markets, we shed light on
an understudied phenomenon that is important in scale and
potential: the international growth of firms from these mar-
kets in developed markets (Burgess and Steenkamp 2006).
To date, most research on the international growth of firms
has only examined the expansion of firms from developed
markets. Yet, as we argue, theories based on the interna-
tional expansion of firms from developed markets are
unlikely to directly apply to firms from emerging markets
given the very different nature of emerging markets and
emerging-market firms. Thus, our article is much in the
spirit of Burgess and Steenkamp (2006, p. 338), who state
that “emerging markets’ institutional contexts present sig-
nificant socioeconomic, demographic, cultural, and regula-
tive departures from the assumptions of theories developed
in the Western world and challenge our conventional under-
standing of constructs and their relations.”
Second, we contribute to the organizational learning and
international marketing literature streams by applying the
former to the latter to offer new substantive insights. To the
best of our knowledge, we are the first to argue and demon-
strate that indirect learning is more important than direct
learning for the international growth of emerging-market
firms in developed markets. Conversely, we show that
direct learning is more important than indirect learning for
the international growth of developed-market firms in other
developed markets. Prior research (which has focused on
the growth of developed-market firms) has emphasized the
importance of direct learning while neglecting the role of
indirect learning (Barkema and Drogendijk 2007; Johanson
and Vahlne 1977). Our article is an attempt to correct this
imbalance.
We also advance the international marketing literature
by making two methodological contributions. First, we
exploit an exogenous change in outward foreign direct
investment (OFDI) policy in the emerging country we con-
sider (India) to address the problem of endogeneity that
hampers much research in the field of international market-
ing (Herrmann and Datta 2005; Reeb, Sakakibara, and
Mahmood 2012). As far as we are aware, this is the first
time such an exogenous policy shift has been used to
address endogeneity in the context of international growth
of emerging-market firms. The exogenous shift that India
experienced was sudden, dramatic, and unanticipated and
allowed for the internationalization of Indian firms. It there-
fore enables us to (1) study the internationalization of
Indian firms practically from the birth of the phenomenon
and (2) prevent an unobserved variable (e.g., the firm’s
intention to internationalize in developed markets) from
influencing both our key independent variables (e.g., choos-
ing leaders with developed market experience) and the
dependent variable of interest (international growth in
developed markets). Second, we compare our results for
Indian firms with data on firms from a developed country
(the United Kingdom). Doing so demonstrates that indirect
learning is uniquely important for the international growth
of firms from emerging markets, as opposed to being a
generic driver of international growth. Such a comparative
counterfactual analysis is novel in the international market-
ing literature and, more specifically, in the context of inter-
national growth.
Theory and Hypotheses
In this section, we develop theory and hypotheses that
address the question of why some emerging-market firms
achieve more international growth in developed markets
than others do. We begin by describing the context in which
emerging-market firms internationalized and how this dif-
fered from the context for developed-market firms. Next,
we develop our theoretical anchor around the concept of
organizational learning and argue that such learning can be
either direct or indirect. We then develop our thesis that
indirect learning provides an important means for emerging-
market firms to gain knowledge of how to compete in
developed markets, in contrast to developed-market firms,
which typically do so through a process of direct learning.
We define indirect versus direct learning and describe the
various sources of indirect learning for emerging-market
firms. We conclude with hypotheses about the impact of the
different sources of indirect learning on the international
growth of emerging-market firms in developed markets.
The Context of Internationalization: Emerging-
Market Versus Developed-Market Firms
The world that emerging-market firms faced when they
internationalized into developed markets was very different
from the one that developed-market firms faced when they
did so. First, when emerging market-firms began to interna-
tionalize into developed markets (in the 1980s and 1990s),
they confronted a world that had already witnessed dra-
matic improvements in communications and transportation
technology and offered unprecedented access to developed
markets through the dismantling of trade barriers (Ghe-
mawat 2011). Emerging-market firms therefore faced far
more intense competition from firms that were already pro-
ficient in operating across developed markets (Luo and
Tung 2007). Specifically, emerging-market firms were
under time pressure to catch up with their developed- and
emerging-market counterparts in growing internationally in
developed markets. In contrast, when developed-market
firms first internationalized (decades earlier), they faced
much less international competition in the markets they
entered (Dunning 1981; Wan and Hoskisson 2003).
Second, when emerging-market firms began to interna-
tionalize, in general, they were coming out of closed
economies that had been shielded from global competition
(Hitt et al. 2000). Emerging-market firms were therefore at
a disadvantage in competitiveness relative to developed-
market firms. In contrast, when developed-market firms
internationalized, they had already been operating in fairly
open and competitive markets and did not have the same
relative disadvantage. Specifically, when emerging-market
firms internationalized, they had far less direct experience
of open and competitive markets compared with their
developed-market counterparts (Burgess and Steenkamp
2006; Sheth 2011; Wan and Hoskisson 2003).
Third, when emerging-market firms began to interna-
tionalize, they came out of economies with institutional
weaknesses, in terms of poorly functioning capital, labor,
and information markets (Khanna and Palepu 2000). In
contrast, when developed-market firms internationalized,
they typically did so from more developed institutional con-
texts. As a result, emerging-market firms faced two disad-
vantages in developed markets relative to developed-market
firms. They faced higher transaction costs of exchange
within their home economies, which in turn made them less
competitive globally. Moreover, they had relatively little
direct knowledge of how to compete in foreign markets,
especially markets with more developed institutions, and
they did not have the luxury of time to acquire this knowl-
edge incrementally through their own experience (Gu,
Hung, and Tse 2009; Kumar, Mohapatra, and Chan-
drasekhar 2009).
Direct Versus Indirect Organizational Learning
How, then, did some emerging-market firms overcome
these limitations and learn how to compete in developed
markets in much harsher competitive conditions and in a
much shorter period of time? We frame our answer to this
question around the theoretical anchor of organizational
learning. There are two types of organizational learning:
direct and indirect (Argote and Miron-Skeptor 2011). Direct
learning in organizations occurs from the organization’s
own experience. In contrast, indirect learning occurs
through the observation, incorporation, and sharing of oth-
ers’ experiences.1
In the context of this article, a focal firm’s indirect learn-
ing about developed markets occurs when the firm learns
through the observation, incorporation, and sharing of oth-
ers’ experiences of developed markets. We argue that indi-
rect learning, in contrast to direct learning, helps emerging-
market firms learn how to compete in developed markets by
aiding them in acquiring this knowledge through the experi-
ence of other entities. Drawing on existing literature, we
argue that indirect learning in firms can occur through indi-
viduals, competitors, and networks (Kim and Miner 2007;
Manz and Sims 1981; Srinivasan, Haunschild, and Grewal
2007). Specifically, we argue that emerging-market firms
gain knowledge of how to compete in developed markets
through their indirect learning from (1) individual leaders,
specifically chief executive officers (CEOs) with education
and work experience from developed markets; (2) industry
competitors such as developed market competitors in
domestic markets, domestic competitors in developed mar-
kets, and global competitors in global markets; and (3) net-
work members operating in developed markets. Next, we
develop hypotheses linking indirect learning through lead-
ers, competitors, and networks to the international growth
of emerging-market firms in developed markets.
Indirect Learning from Leaders and International
Growth in Developed Markets
Leaders with education and work experience from devel-
oped markets play a particularly important role in the inter-
national growth of emerging-market firms (Herrmann and
Datta 2005; Sambharya 1996). First, leaders’ managerial
discretion (i.e., their ability to make unilateral decisions) is
particularly high in emerging-market relative to developed-
market firms (Crossland and Hambrick 2011; Guillen
2000). Specifically, the weak enforcement of corporate gov-
ernance laws in emerging markets makes it easier for lead-
ers to drive decision making within their firms (Guillen
2000). Thus, leaders with education and work experience
from developed markets can ensure that their knowledge of
developed markets has a substantial influence on decisions
related to the international growth of the firms they lead.
Second, relative to their developed-market counterparts,
emerging-market firms more likely originate from highly
protected economies that constrain the extent to which
these firms have direct experience of developed markets.
Therefore, the knowledge and experience that their leaders
bring from other contexts (through their education and
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1Our construct of indirect learning is related to other constructs
used in the literature such as “vicarious learning.” Note, however,
that vicarious learning is gained from other entities outside the
firm (see Kim and Miner 2007; Manz and Sims 1981; Srinivasan,
Haunschild, and Grewal 2007). Indirect learning is a more general
construct because it includes both vicarious learning and learning
through the experience of people or entities (e.g., executives) who
become part of the firm and bring their own learning with them.
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experience in developed markets) is particularly important
for emerging-market firms. Moreover, such education and
experience is less common among leaders of emerging-
market relative to developed-market firms. Thus, such edu-
cation and experience is a novel, relatively inimitable
resource for some emerging-market firms, giving it greater
importance in their international growth. Specifically, edu-
cation and work experience in developed markets can help
leaders of emerging-market firms learn what it takes to
enter and compete in developed markets (Hitt et al. 2000).
Leaders with such education and experience have a better
understanding of the institutions that underpin business in
developed markets. They also have firsthand awareness of
the quality of products available in developed markets and
therefore of the improvements that their emerging-market
firm must make to match the expectations of developed-
market customers. More generally, through their keener
appreciation of the opportunities and challenges of devel-
oped markets, such leaders are able to make them salient to
other decision makers within the firm (Herrmann and Datta
2005; Sambharya 1996). In light of these arguments, we
hypothesize the following:
H1: Emerging-market firms that have leaders with education
and work experience from developed markets exhibit
greater international growth in developed markets than
other emerging-market firms.
Indirect Learning from Competitors and
International Growth in Developed Markets
Emerging-market firms can also learn indirectly about how
to compete in developed markets from competitors within
their industry. Specifically, they can learn by observing the
activities of developed-market competitors in domestic
markets, of domestic competitors in developed markets, and
of global competitors in global markets.
When the process of liberalization in emerging markets
began, the initial contact between developed- and emerging-
market firms occurred in the emerging markets themselves.
This was because, as industry sectors within emerging mar-
kets opened up to international competition, firms from
developed economies were more prepared to move across
markets due to their superior experience with internationali-
zation (Dunning 1981; Johanson and Vahlne 1977). In the
next phase of the liberalization of their economies, as state
controls were further lifted, some emerging-market firms
from outward-looking industries began to venture into
developed markets (Elango and Patnaik 2007; Pradhan
2007). In the final phase, as they grew even more global
and ambitious, some emerging-market firms began to
benchmark themselves against industry-wide competitors in
global markets (Boston Consulting Group 2011). The
global competitors of the final phase were typically differ-
ent from the developed-market competitors of the first
phase in that they were far more dominant in major markets
of the world and positioned at the cutting edge of their
respective industries. For example, whereas competitors in
the first phase might have been Dutch firms with a presence
in India, those in the final phase would have been U.S. or
Japanese firms with dominance in most large markets of the
world. In the following hypotheses, we apply insights from
these phases of competitive interaction to discuss the
impact on the international growth of emerging-market
firms in developed markets.
Indirect learning from developed-market competitors.
When firms from emerging markets began to international-
ize into developed markets, they were typically at a disad-
vantage relative to developed-market competitors within
their industry in terms of technology, marketing and inno-
vation, and general business processes (Wright et al. 2005).
They could overcome this disadvantage by learning indi-
rectly from developed-market competitors that operated in
their domestic markets. Specifically, they could learn which
technologies to invest in, how to manage brands, how to
make better product decisions, and how to develop superior
business processes from their developed-market competi-
tors with more advanced knowledge on these dimensions.
This indirect learning would in turn enable some emerging-
market firms to develop the brands, products, technologies,
management skills, and business processes they needed to
compete in developed markets.
Indirect learning from developed-market competitors
was more likely to occur in sectors in which such competi-
tors were more prominent in the domestic market. For
example, Chinese telecom equipment companies such as
Huawei and ZTE had greater opportunities to learn about
brands, products, and technologies and, thus, greater oppor-
tunities to compete in developed markets by observing the
actions of developed-market competitors such as Nokia-
Siemens Networks (operating in China). Drawing on these
arguments, we hypothesize the following:
H2a: Emerging-market firms that have greater exposure to
developed-market competitors in their domestic market
exhibit greater international growth in developed markets
than other emerging-market firms.
Indirect learning from domestic competitors. Emerging-
market firms aiming to internationalize into developed mar-
kets can also learn indirectly from their domestic competi-
tors operating in developed markets. Specifically, some
emerging-market firms can observe how their domestic
competitors cope in developed markets despite having weaker
brands and inferior technology than their developed-market
counterparts. Because they interact closely with other domes-
tic competitors in their industry, some emerging-market
firms can observe, for example, how their domestic peers
overcome these disadvantages through the purchase of
developed-market brands and technology.
Indirect learning by observing domestic peers in devel-
oped markets is more likely in industries that are further
along in their international growth and more closely inte-
grated into developed markets. Such industries provide fol-
lower firms more opportunity to indirectly learn about
developed markets by observing the activities of their lead-
ing domestic peers. For example, the Indian information
technology industry (which is closely integrated into devel-
oped markets) has a host of companies that have learned
how to grow in developed markets by observing and incor-
porating the approaches of leading domestic competitors
such as Wipro and Infosys (Kumar, Mohapatra, and Chan-
drasekhar 2009). Thus,
H2b: Emerging-market firms that have domestic competitors
with greater developed-market experience exhibit greater
international growth in developed markets than other
emerging-market firms.
Indirect learning from global competitors. Emerging-
market firms can learn indirectly about how to compete in
developed markets by observing the activities of a third
type of competitor: truly global firms that dominate their
industry in global markets. Truly global, dominant firms act
as role models for other firms in their industry that aspire to
a global presence. Emerging-market firms with global aspi-
rations are particularly likely to look to such firms for inspi-
ration and learning.
In industries in which dominant global firms loom
large, the activities of these global behemoths are more
salient. Moreover, the gap between emerging-market firms
and their leading global competitors is so wide, in terms of
brands, products, and technologies, that this provides the
emerging-market firms more opportunity to learn what it
takes to compete globally. For example, Tata Steel, an
Indian steel manufacturer that operates in the concentrated
global steel industry, learned indirectly about international
expansion by studying the international expansion of
Arcelor Mittal, the world’s largest steel manufacturer
(Kumar, Mohapatra, and Chandrasekhar 2009). Therefore,
we propose the following:
H2c: Emerging-market firms in sectors with large global com-
petitors exhibit greater international growth in developed
markets than other emerging-market firms.
Indirect Learning from Networks and International
Growth in Developed Markets
Finally, emerging-market firms can also learn indirectly
about how to compete in developed markets through firms
in their networks that operate in developed markets. The
most common form of interfirm networks in emerging mar-
kets are business groups. A business group is “a set of firms
which, though legally independent, are bound together by a
constellation of formal and informal ties and are accus-
tomed to taking coordinated action” (Khanna and Rivkin
2001, p. 47). Although business groups can also be found in
developed markets, they are particularly common in emerg-
ing markets (Elango and Patnaik 2007; Khanna and Palepu
2000; Khanna and Rivkin 2001). The relatively inferior
institutions of emerging markets result in poorly function-
ing capital, labor, and information markets, which in turn
increase the transaction costs of doing business in emerging
markets. By setting up internal markets for capital, labor,
and information, business groups are able to reduce these
costs and the overall disadvantage of doing business in an
environment with poor home-country institutions (Khanna
and Palepu 2000; Khanna and Rivkin 2001).
Three aspects of business groups make them a relevant
source of indirect learning for firms that aim to compete in
developed markets. First, member firms within business
groups are bound by ties such as cross-shareholding, inter-
locking directorates, and social relationships. These ties
provide member firms with privileged access to one
another’s knowledge about what works in developed mar-
kets (Yiu et al. 2007). Moreover, there is a core administra-
tive entity within business groups that provides common
administration and managerial coordination (Yiu et al.
2007). This in turn facilitates better learning between mem-
ber firms. Finally, member firms operate in different indus-
tries—some of which have greater exposure in developed
markets than others—and this facilitates learning across
sectors.
Emerging-market firms in networks can learn indirectly
about how to compete in developed markets in at least two
ways (Elango and Patnaik 2007). First, the direct experi-
ence of other member firms in developed markets provides
firsthand knowledge about what it takes to achieve success
and avoid failure as firms plan and execute their own
growth in developed markets (Elango and Patnaik 2007).
For example, firms can learn how to leverage the existing
relationships of network members to gain knowledge about
developed-market customers and suppliers.
Second, firms in business groups can benefit from the
experience of member firms in other industries that may be
further along in their international growth and more closely
integrated into developed markets. By their very nature,
business groups operate in multiple industries (Khanna and
Palepu 2000). Some industries encounter the challenges and
opportunities of developed-market competition earlier than
other industries. Managers of a firm planning to operate in
developed markets in a particular industry can learn about
best practices from member firms that have achieved
greater international growth in more competitive or leading-
edge industries. Given these arguments, we hypothesize the
following:
H3: Emerging-market firms that have network members with
more developed-market experience exhibit greater inter-
national growth in developed markets than other emerging-
market firms.
Any empirical approach that aims to test our hypotheses
should ideally address two challenges that have been endemic
to the study of international growth. First, the empirical
approach should permit us to rule out alternative explana-
tions for the international growth of emerging-market firms
in developed markets (i.e., explanations other than our indi-
rect learning explanation) and allow us to account for
potential sources of bias from endogeneity (see Herrmann
and Datta 2005; Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood 2012).
Second, the empirical approach should demonstrate that the
indirect learning variables we propose are uniquely impor-
tant to emerging-market firms and are not simply generic
variables that also apply to the international growth of
developed-market firms.
The empirical approach we describe in the next section
addresses each of these challenges. Endogeneity resulting
from omitted variables is a concern because it is possible
that an unobserved (and difficult-to-measure) factor—inten-
tion to internationalize in developed markets—could influ-
ence our independent variables (i.e., the indirect learning
variables) as well as the dependent variable (international
14 / Journal of Marketing, January 2015
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growth in developed markets). Any empirical approach that
does not account for this potential source of endogeneity in
indirect learning will likely yield biased estimates. We
address the issue of endogeneity by choosing an empirical
context that experienced an exogenous and unexpected pol-
icy shock. We make use of this exogenous shock to rule out
the most obvious sources of endogeneity. Moreover, we
account for unobserved variance from firm-specific and
time-specific factors by tracking the same firms over time
and accounting for unobserved heterogeneity in our model
specification.
We show the unique importance of our indirect learning
variables to emerging-market firms in two ways. First, we
control for several factors prior literature has suggested are
important to the international growth of firms in general.
We then examine whether the effects of the indirect learn-
ing variables that emanate from our theoretical framework
persist even after we control for the previously studied fac-
tors. Second, we examine the significance of our indirect
learning variables for a sample of emerging-market firms as
well as for a counterfactual sample of developed-market
firms (see Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood 2012). By esti-
mating the effects of these variables in both contexts sepa-
rately and by pooling both the samples, we are able to
assess the relative importance of indirect learning in each
context. This approach enables us to examine whether our
indirect learning explanation is uniquely important to
emerging-market firms or merely a generic explanation for
the international growth of firms. The next section
describes our empirical approach in more detail.
Method
Empirical Context
We test our hypotheses on a sample of firms from an impor-
tant and representative emerging market: India. To contrast
our results for India against a counterfactual, we also collect
data from a developed economy: the United Kingdom.
Next, we discuss our choice of India and then discuss why
the United Kingdom provides an appropriate counterfactual
to the Indian context.
India. India provides an ideal empirical context in
which to test our hypotheses for three reasons. First, in
recent years it has been one of the fastest-growing emerging
economies in the world, with many Indian firms making
their presence known globally. For example, the Boston
Consulting Group’s (2011) “BCG Global Challengers”
report places 20 Indian firms in the top 100 firms from
emerging markets with significant international growth.
Second, in the Indian context, international growth has
largely been driven by non-state-owned firms, making our
data and findings more representative of firm-based drivers
of growth (as opposed to growth from state patronage). For
example, all 20 Indian firms in the 2011 “BCG Global 
Challengers” report are publicly traded, non-state-owned
firms. This context ensures that the international growth of
firms in our sample is more likely to be driven by a profit-
maximization motive. International growth by state-owned
enterprises, in contrast, might be driven by more nationalis-
tic motives, such as fortifying economic influence region-
ally and globally, thus representing a different phenomenon
from that studied here.
Third, the Indian context provides an institutional set-
ting in which it is easier to make robust inferences. Restric-
tions on the international growth of domestic firms in India
were lifted fairly recently. Specifically, India experienced a
well-documented, sudden, and unanticipated OFDI policy
shift in May 1999 when Indian firms were first allowed to
internationalize without consent from the Indian govern-
ment, without repatriation of the amount invested abroad,
and with an increase in upper limit for foreign investment
from $2 million to $15 million (Government of India 1999;
Pradhan 2007). This important OFDI policy shift resulted in
a steep rise in the developed market revenues of Indian
firms (see Figure 1, which presents inflation-adjusted aver-
FIGURE 1
Average Annual Revenues in Developed Markets for the Indian Sample
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Year
Av
er
ag
e 
R
ev
en
u
es
 
in
 
D
ev
el
o
pe
d
M
ar
ke
ts
Notes: Revenues shown in millions of U.S. dollars. These values have been adjusted for inflation with the base year as 1998.
age annual revenues in U.S. dollars for our sample of
firms). The OFDI policy shift also provides two advantages.
First, because the shift occurred in the recent past, it pre-
sents an opportunity to study the international growth of
emerging-market firms in developed markets practically
from inception (i.e., from the moment that serious interna-
tionalization first became possible) (Pradhan 2007). Sec-
ond, the policy shift enables us to alleviate concerns result-
ing from endogeneity. Despite other liberalizing reforms
that had been put in place since 1991 (when India’s econ-
omy began to open up), stringent restrictions on OFDIs
remained an article of faith within Indian policy circles
throughout the 1990s. The presence of these restrictive poli-
cies on Indian firms until the late 1990s enables us to pre-
vent an unobserved variable (e.g., the firm’s intention to
internationalize in developed markets) from influencing
two of our key independent variables (choosing leaders
with developed-market experience and choosing industries
with competitors that have developed market experience) as
well as the dependent variable of interest (international
growth in developed markets). Specifically, the sudden and
unanticipated removal of restrictions in 1999 significantly
reduces the likelihood that firms intended to grow in devel-
oped markets before 1999 and thus reduces the likelihood
that they previously chose leaders or industries that would
promote international growth in developed markets.
United Kingdom. An ideal test of our thesis would
require us to compare the results for our emerging-market
sample with those of a counterfactual developed-market
sample (Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood 2012). Specifi-
cally, we would need to compare our results for the emerg-
ing market (India) with firms from a comparable developed
(i.e., nonemerging) market that did not go through the pol-
icy shift that the Indian firms experienced.
We chose the United Kingdom to serve as this counter-
factual for the following reasons. First, it has been a long
time since U.K. firms faced restrictions on internationaliza-
tion. Indeed, U.K. firms have actively ventured into and
grown in international markets since 1600, when the East
India Company received its Royal Charter (National
Archives 2013). Thus, while India discouraged and even
prevented its firms from venturing into international mar-
kets until 1999, the United Kingdom has encouraged its
firms to venture into international markets for several cen-
turies. Second, the United Kingdom represents a developed
economy with well-established institutions such as efficient
capital, labor, and information markets, thus providing an
effective contrast to India, which, as an emerging market,
has relatively poorly functioning institutions. These two
differences between India and the United Kingdom capture
the disparate circumstances under which emerging-market
firms internationalized relative to their developed-market
counterparts.
Third, although U.K. firms provide an important con-
trast to firms from India, these countries also have two
important commonalities that provide us with somewhat
comparable samples. In both India and the United King-
dom, international growth has largely been driven by pub-
licly traded non-state-owned firms, making our findings
more representative of firm-based drivers of growth. Fur-
thermore, India and the United Kingdom have economies of
a comparable size: the Indian gross domestic product in
2012 was $1.8 trillion, and the United Kingdom’s gross
domestic product in 2012 was $2.4 trillion (International
Monetary Fund 2013).
Data and Sample
We compiled two archival databases (one for India and one
for the United Kingdom) spanning ten years (1999–2008)
from multiple sources (see Table 1). The BSE 500 index of
the Bombay Stock Exchange served as the population from
which we drew our Indian sample, and the FTSE 350 index
of the London Stock Exchange served as the population for
our U.K. sample. Both indices capture almost the full value
of the stock market: the BSE 500 index comprises 93% of
the market capitalization of the Bombay Stock Exchange,
and the FTSE 350 comprises 90% of the market capitaliza-
tion of the London Stock Exchange. Data on all the
variables for 1999–2008 for the firms on the BSE 500 and
FTSE 350 were available for 384 (76.8%) and 313 (89.4 %)
firms, respectively.
We applied three filters to this population of 384 Indian
and 313 U.K. firms to arrive at our final sample. First, we
followed previous studies (e.g., Chittoor et al. 2009) and
removed firms that are subsidiaries of foreign multination-
als from the populations of Indian and U.K. firms. By doing
so, we ensure that we compare a sample in which all firms
are from emerging markets with a sample in which all firms
are from developed markets. As a result, we dropped 84 and
82 firms from the Indian and U.K. samples, respectively.
Second, we omitted state-owned firms from the samples
because, as we noted previously, such firms do not always
pursue a profit-maximization objective and are therefore
not representative of the phenomenon of interest. Thus, we
dropped 48 and 0 firms from the Indian and U.K. samples,
respectively. Third, we excluded firms classified as finan-
cial institutions because such firms are regulated by central
banks, making them unique and nonrepresentative of the
phenomenon under study. Consequently, we dropped 38
and 71 firms from the Indian and U.K. samples, respec-
tively, giving us a sample of 214 Indian and 160 U.K. firms.
From this sample, we excluded an additional 98 Indian
firms that were established after 1992 because 1992 was a
watershed year in Indian macroeconomic policy, when
major changes were implemented that lowered state inter-
vention and boosted private enterprise. Firms established
after 1992 operated in a liberal, highly competitive eco-
nomic environment from inception, whereas firms estab-
lished before 1992 initially operated in a protected environ-
ment. Because the firms established after 1992 are
nonrepresentative of the phenomenon under study, we
removed them to achieve a final sample of 116 Indian
firms.
We collected data on 13 variables from nine sources
over the ten years. Table 1 lists the conceptual variables, the
measured variables, and our data sources. We describe each
of our measures next.
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Dependent Variables
Following the bulk of prior research, we use revenues in
developed markets to calculate our measure of international
growth in developed markets (GROWDEVMARK) in both
our Indian and U.K. samples (Ramaswamy, Kroeck, and
Renforth 1996). We record revenues in developed markets
annually from 1999 to 2008. We then convert the data to
U.S. dollars (USD) using the relevant exchange rates. We
adjust for inflation by dividing revenues by the Consumer
Price Index (in India and the United Kingdom) with the
base year as 1998. We then apply a logarithmic transforma-
tion to this inflation-adjusted value to reduce the difference
between extreme values. Because a logarithmic transforma-
tion is not possible for revenues with a value of 0, we add a
negligible value (.00001) to all revenue figures before we
perform the transformation. We then calculate the final
measure of international growth in developed markets for
both the Indian and the U.K. samples by measuring the first
difference of the log-transformed revenues in developed
markets. The first difference of a log-transformed series
provides a good measure for growth (year-on-year percent-
age change in revenues) of the original series.2 In using
such a measure to capture growth, we follow extensive
prior research in marketing and other disciplines (see Barro
and Sala-i-Martin 1992; Fama 1965; Fornell, Rust, and
Dekimpe 2010). We also use an alternative measure of
international growth—log-transformed revenues in devel-
Conceptual Variable Measured Variable Data Source for India
Data Source for United
Kingdom
Dependent Variable
International growth in
developed markets
Log (Revenues in Developed Marketsit) –
Log (Revenues in Developed Marketsit – 1)
Prowess database, 
company annual reports
Thomson One Banker,
Fame
Independent Variables
Indirect learning from
leaders
CEO education or work experience from
developed markets
Prowess database,
Prime Directors
Thomson One Banker
Indirect learning from
foreign competitors
Ratio of sum of revenues of developed
market competitors to sum of revenues of
all competitors in domestic market
Prowess database Thomson One Banker,
Fame
Indirect learning from
domestic competitors
Sum of revenues from developed markets
for the top three domestic competitors
Prowess database, 
company annual reports
Thomson One Banker,
Fame
Indirect learning from
global competitors
Sum of revenues of top three global 
competitors
Thomson One Banker Thomson One Banker
Indirect learning from
networks
Product of scale and scope of developed
market revenues of business group 
members
Prowess database, 
company annual reports
Thomson One Banker,
Fame
Controls
Age Age of the firm Prowess database Company history
Size Revenue of the firm Osiris, Prowess 
database
Thomson One Banker
Industry Industry dummy National industrial 
classification
FTSE 350 Sector 
Classification
R&D expenses R&D expenses Prowess database Thomson One Banker
Domestic industry
rivalry
Herfindahl–Hirschman index Prowess database Thomson One Banker
Past international
growth in developed
markets
Log(Revenues in Developed Marketsit – 2) –
Log(Revenues in Developed Marketsit – 3)
Prowess database, 
company annual reports
Thomson One Banker &
Fame
Past international
growth in emerging
markets
Log(Revenues in Emerging Marketsit – 2) –
Log(Revenues in Emerging Marketsit – 3)
Prowess database, 
company annual reports
Thomson One Banker &
Fame
Past acquisitions in
developed markets
Log (Acquisitions Value from Developed
Marketsit – 2) – Log (Acquisitions Value
from Developed Marketsit – 3)
Thomson One Banker Thomson One Banker
TABLE 1
Summary of Measures and Sources
2Growth in variable x between period t and period t – 1 is 
calculated as Growth (g) = (xt – xt – 1)/xt – 1, which is equivalent to
xt/xt – 1 = 1 + g. Log-transformation of both sides of the expression
results in log(xt) – log(xt – 1) = log(1 + g). Using a Taylor series,
we rewrite log(1 + g) as g – g2/2 + g3/3 – g4/4, and so on. This
expression can be approximated to log(1 + g) = g. Therefore,
growth of a variable can be approximately measured as a first dif-
ference of the log-transformed variable—that is, g = (xt – xt – 1)/
xt – 1 = log(xt) – log(xt – 1).
oped markets—and repeat our analysis with this measure.
Our results hold for this alternative measure, as we report in
the “Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks” section.
Independent Variables
Indirect learning from leaders (LEADERIL). Of the
firm’s leaders, the CEO has a disproportionately large influ-
ence on strategic decision making within the firm (Ham-
brick and Mason 1984). International growth is a major
strategic issue and is likely to involve the CEO in a signifi-
cant way. Moreover, CEOs have particularly high manage-
rial discretion in emerging markets (Crossland and Ham-
brick 2011; Guillen 2000). For these reasons, we measure
indirect learning from leaders by focusing on the back-
ground of the CEO.3
In the context of the international growth of emerging-
market firms, a key aspect of indirect learning from leaders
is the developed-market experience of these leaders. Fol-
lowing extensive previous research, we operationalize
developed-market experience by measuring CEOs’ educa-
tional and work experience in developed markets (Ham-
brick and Mason 1984; Herrmann and Datta 2005; Samb-
harya 1996). This is an appropriate measure for two
reasons. First, education and work experience from devel-
oped markets broaden CEOs’ cognitive horizon and make
them aware of customers, competitors, and regulations in
developed markets (Sambharya 1996). Second, demo-
graphic measures such as education and work experience
provide comprehensiveness, objectivity, parsimony, predic-
tive power, and testability (Hambrick and Mason 1984).
Collecting biographical information on the early lives of
CEOs in India and the United Kingdom is a tedious and
time-consuming task that requires careful piecemeal inves-
tigation across many sources. In an ideal world, we would
have accurate and detailed (continuous) data for all the
CEOs from all the firms studied. In reality, however, it is
virtually impossible to attain such data, and we are faced
with a choice between including only continuous variables
for a limited set of firms and including slightly coarser mea-
sures for a more complete set of firms. To maximize data
coverage across firms while minimizing information loss
due to coarse measures, we triangulate across four mea-
sures. We standardize each of these measures across the
focal firm’s industry and then consolidate by summing
across the four standardized measures to generate our final
measure of indirect learning through CEOs’ developed mar-
ket knowledge.4 The details of the measures are as follows:
1. Extent of international education: Score of 1 if number of
years of developed-market education is less than one year,
score of 2 if number of years of developed-market educa-
tion is between one and five years, and score of 3 if number
of years of developed-market education is greater than five
years.
2. Extent of international experience: Score of 1 if number of
years of developed-market experience is less than one year,
score of 2 if number of years of developed-market experi-
ence is between one and five years, and score of 3 if num-
ber of years of developed-market experience is greater than
five years.
3. Level of international education: Score of 1 if the CEO had
pre-undergraduate-level education in developed markets,
score of 2 if the CEO had undergraduate-level education in
developed markets, and score of 3 the CEO had postgraduate-
level education in developed markets.5
4. Level of work experience: Score of 1 if a person had 
operational-level experience in developed markets, score of
2 if a person had tactical-level experience in developed
markets, and score of 3 if the person had strategic-level
experience in developed markets.6
Indirect learning from developed-market competitors in
the domestic market (DEVCOMPIL). To measure indirect
learning from developed-market competitors, we use the
market share of all publicly held developed-market com-
petitors in the domestic market (i.e., a ratio of the sum of
revenues of all publicly held developed-market competitors
in the domestic market to the sum of revenues of all pub-
licly held competitors in the domestic market). This mea-
sure is a proxy for the extent of developed-market competi-
tion in the focal firm’s home market (Elango and Patnaik
2007). The greater this competition, the greater the knowl-
edge of developed markets that exists in the domestic mar-
ket, and the greater the extent to which firms can learn from
such competitors. We add a small value (.00001) to the
revenue figures and perform a log-transformation to reduce
the difference between extreme values.
Indirect learning from domestic competitors (DOMCOM-
PIL). We add the developed market revenues of the top three
publicly listed domestic competitors of a firm to measure
indirect learning from domestic competitors. This measure
is a good proxy for the extent of a firm’s domestic competi-
tors’ developed-market activity (Chittoor et al. 2009; Elango
and Patnaik 2007): the greater this value, the greater the extent
to which emerging-market firms can learn indirectly from
such competitors. We add a negligible value (.00001) to the
relevant revenue figures and perform a log-transformation
to reduce the difference between extreme values.
Indirect learning from global competitors (GLOBCOM-
PIL). We measure indirect learning from global competitors
using the sum of the revenues of the top three global com-
petitors of the focal firm: the greater this value, the greater
the extent to which emerging-market firms can learn indi-
rectly from such competitors. We identify the top three
global competitors by matching the Standard Industrial
Classification between the focal firm and the global com-
petitors and then selecting the top three firms. For example,
for British Petroleum, a Standard Industrial Classification
match for the top three global competitors would include
ExxonMobil, Total, and Chevron. The revenues for the top
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3Our results are robust to replacing the CEO with the chairperson.
4Robustness checks show that our results hold for a simple
dichotomous measure of whether the CEO had international edu-
cation or experience; the results also hold for unstandardized mea-
sures and a measure standardized across all industries.
5Our results also hold if we assign a score of 1 for CEOs with a
pre-undergraduate level of education and a score of 2 for CEOs
with an undergraduate and beyond level of education.
6Nonmanagerial positions are classified as “operational,” mana-
gerial positions up to general manager are classified as “tactical,”
and positions above general manager are classified as “strategic.”
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three global competitors can be in different world currencies,
so we transform all revenues into U.S. dollars for each firm
from 1999 to 2008. We perform a log-transformation of the
sum of revenues for the top three global competitors and use it
as our measure of indirect learning from global competitors.
Indirect learning from networks (NETWORKIL).
Because the focus of this study is international growth in
developed markets, we measure a focal firm’s indirect
learning from the network by using the developed-market
revenues of network members. In this way, we are able to
capture how much the focal firm can indirectly learn about
developed markets from the scale and scope of the net-
work’s developed-market activity.
We operationalize indirect learning from networks as
indirect learning through business groups. We construct a
measure of scale and scope of a network’s developed-market
activity by multiplying the total developed-market revenues
of a business group (scale) with the most commonly used
measure of scope: entropy (see Sorescu, Chandy, and
Prabhu 2003).7 For each firm affiliated with the business
group, we calculate the scale and scope of the network’s
developed-market activity for every year from 1999 to 2008
in the following manner:
where A = the business group’s total developed-market
revenues in each year from 1999 to 2008, Aj = developed-
market revenues of the jth member firm within the business
group in each year from 1999 to 2008, and E = entropy
measure of the business group.
Following previous research (see Khanna and Palepu
2000), we use the Prowess classification of Indian firms and
the Fame classification of U.K. firms to identify a firm’s
business group affiliation. (Prowess and Fame examine the
family and ownership ties of firms to classify firms as mem-
bers of a business group.) First, we record the developed-
market revenues of member firms of a business group from
Prowess and Fame. We then use the developed-market reve-
nues of member firms (excluding those of the focal firm) to
calculate the scale and scope of the network’s developed-
market expansion from Equation 1. For firms unaffiliated
with a business group, the scale and scope of the network’s
developed-market expansion takes a value of 0. For firms
affiliated with business groups, the greater the value of
Equation 1, the greater the scale and scope of developed-
market expansion and, thus, the greater the focal firm’s
indirect learning from the business group regarding how to
compete in developed markets. We add a negligible value
(1) Scale and scope of network's developed market activity
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(.00001) to the output of Equation 1 and perform a log-
transformation to obtain the final measure of indirect learn-
ing from networks.
Control Variables
Age (AGE). Prior research has suggested that the age of a
firm influences its international growth (Elango and Patnaik
2007). We calculate the age of the firm by subtracting the
year that the firm was established from every year between
1999 and 2008. We then perform a log-transformation of
the firm’s age and use this value in our analysis.
Size (SIZE). Prior research has suggested that the size of
a firm influences its international growth (Sambharya
1996). We convert the revenues of Indian and U.K. firms to
millions of U.S. dollars and then adjust this number for
inflation, with the base year as 1998. We then perform a
log-transformation of this value. Our use of revenues as a
measure of firm size is consistent with prior research on
international growth (Sambharya 1996).
Industry (INDUSTRY). Our Indian sample is classified
into ten industries using the single-digit National Industrial
Classification of India. Our U.K. sample is classified into 26
industries using the FTSE sector classification. Industries
represented in both samples include pharmaceuticals, mining
and quarrying, automotives, information technology, metals,
industrial machinery, chemicals, and health care. We control
for industry in the Indian and U.K. samples by developing a
set of dummy variables for each industry in the sample.
Research-and-development expenses (R&D). Prior
research has suggested that firms with greater R&D expenses
are able to achieve greater international growth (Chittoor et
al. 2009). We use R&D expenses for firms in our India and
U.K. samples for each year from 1999 to 2008. We convert
the R&D expenses of Indian and U.K. firms to millions of
U.S. dollars and then adjust this number for inflation, with
the base year as 1998. We add a negligible value (.00001) to
the R&D expenses and perform a log-transformation to
obtain the final measure of R&D expenses.
Domestic industry rivalry (HHI). The international mar-
keting literature has argued that domestic industry rivalry
forces firms to expand across borders (Gielens and
Dekimpe 2007), thus influencing international growth. We
measure domestic industry rivalry for each firm in each
year between 1999 and 2008 using the logarithm of the
Herfindahl–Hirschman index (HHI). Previous literature has
used the HHI because it is a comprehensive measure that
takes into account the market share of all competitors
within a firm’s industry. We calculate the HHI as follows:
where si is the market share of firm i in the domestic market
and N is the number of firms in the domestic market.
We calculate the market share si for firm i as a ratio of
revenues of the firm i in the domestic market and the sum
of revenues of all competitor firms in the domestic market.
We add a negligible value (.00001) to the HHI and perform
∑=
=
(2) HHI s ,i2
i 1
N
7We use this multiplicative measure because the entropy mea-
sure by itself does not differentiate the various scales of business
groups. For example, the entropy measure by itself would be iden-
tical for a business group with substantial developed-market reve-
nues that are spread equally across five member firms relative to a
business group with much smaller developed-market revenues that
are also spread equally across five member firms.
a log-transformation to obtain the final measure of domestic
industry rivalry.
Past international growth in developed markets
(GROWDEVMARKit – 2). Research has shown that past
international growth is a predictor of future international
growth (Dunning 1981; Johanson and Vahlne 1977).
Research has also argued that past international growth in
developed markets is a source of direct learning about
developed markets (Johanson and Vahlne 1977). We mea-
sure past international growth in developed markets as the
difference between log-transformed revenues in developed
markets between years t – 2 and t – 3.
Past international growth in emerging markets
(GROWEMARKit – 2). Previous literature has argued that
past international growth in emerging markets is a source of
learning about the process of internationalization, which in
turn can drive international growth in developed markets
(Kumar, Mohapatra, and Chandrasekhar 2009). We there-
fore control for past international growth in emerging mar-
kets using the difference between log-transformed revenues
in emerging markets between years t – 2 and t – 3.
Past acquisitions in developed markets (ACQit – 2).
Research has suggested that past acquisitions in developed
markets can serve as a source of learning that drives inter-
national growth in developed markets (Kumar, Mohapatra,
and Chandrasekhar 2009). We control for past acquisitions
in developed markets using the first difference between log-
transformed acquisition values in developed markets
between years t – 2 and t – 3.
Model
We test our hypotheses using panel estimation with a two-
step sample selection model. Because we have panel data,
we correct for sample selection using the Orme method
(Arulampalam and Stewart 2009; Orme 1997). The main
merit of using the Orme method over the Heckman correction
for panel data is that this method does not require separate
programming and can be straightforwardly estimated using
standard software (Arulampalam and Stewart 2009). We
use the Orme method to estimate the selection model
(Equation 4) using a pooled probit specification. From this
output, we calculate the inverse Mills ratio and use it as a
control in the substantive model (Equation 3). Specifically,
we estimate the following two equations:
(3) GROWDEVMARKit = b0 + b1LEADERILit – 1
+ b2DEVCOMPILit – 1
+ b3DOMCOMPILit – 1
+ b4GLOBCOMPILit – 1
+ b5NETWORKILit – 1 + b6AGEit – 1
+ b7SIZEit – 1 + b8R&Dit – 1 + b9HHIit – 1
+ b10GROWDEVMARKit – 2
+ b11GROWEMARKit – 2
+ b12ACQit – 2
+ b12Inverse Mills Ratio + eit + gi, and
(4)    P(Nonzero Revenues in Developed Marketsit = 1) = a0
+ a1SIZEit – 1 + a2R&Dit – 1 + a3PERFORMANCEit – 1 + mit + hi,
where i is the subscript for a firm; t is the subscript for a
year; GROWDEVMARK is international growth in devel-
oped markets; LEADERIL is indirect learning from leaders;
DEVCOMPIL, DOMCOMPIL, and GLOBCOMPIL are
indirect learning from developed market, domestic, and
global competitors, respectively; NETWORKIL is indirect
learning from networks; HHI is industry rivalry;
GROWDEVMARKit – 2 and GROWEMARKit – 2 are past
international growth in developed markets and emerging
markets, respectively; and ACQit – 2 is past acquisitions in
developed markets.
We estimate these equations on the Indian sample and
then repeat the estimation on the U.K. sample. We also per-
form estimations using the pooled data. Together, these analy-
ses enable us to test our hypotheses for emerging-market
firms (the Indian sample) and compare these results with
the international growth of developed-market firms (the
U.K. sample).
Panel estimation with a sample selection model enables
us to do the following. First, the panel estimation helps us
use the temporal separation between the dependent and
independent variables, which ensures that we test for the
effects of learning (independent variables) on international
growth in developed markets (dependent variable) rather
than the other way around. Second, the panel estimation
helps us alleviate the possibility of endogeneity caused by
an unobserved variable, which can influence both the
dependent and independent variables. This is because we
specify a panel estimation model in which both the depen-
dent and independent variables are measured after the
removal of restrictive policies in India in 1999. As we have
noted, the presence of these restrictive policies until 1999
enables us to prevent an unobserved variable (such as the
firm’s intention to internationalize in developed markets)
from influencing both key independent variables (e.g.,
choosing leaders with developed market experience, choos-
ing industries with competitors that have developed market
experience) and the dependent variable of interest (i.e.,
international growth in developed markets).
Third, the panel estimation enables us to control for fac-
tors other than the ones we hypothesize as drivers of the
international growth of firms. For example, our model
enables us to control for firm- and time-specific hetero-
geneity, thus addressing two potential sources of bias from
unobserved heterogeneity. The model also controls for
time-invariant variables such as industry effects and time-
varying variables such as prior revenues and R&D
expenses.
Fourth, the panel estimation with the sample selection
model enables us to account for sample selection bias in our
data. We find that 43 of 116 firms in the Indian sample and
28 of 160 firms in the U.K. sample did not obtain any reve-
nues from developed markets between 1999 and 2008. We
correct for self-selection in the choice to pursue revenues in
developed markets by choosing the predictors for the selec-
tion equation carefully and ensuring that we fulfill exclu-
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sion restrictions. We use size, performance, and R&D as
predictors and measure them using total revenues, return on
sales, and R&D expenses, respectively (Chittoor et al.
2009). We fulfill the exclusion restriction by having at least
one variable (i.e., return on sales) in the selection equation
(Equation 4) that does not appear in the substantive equa-
tion (Equation 3). Doing so facilitates model identification
while correcting for sample selection.
Results
We present means, standard deviations, minimum and
maximum values, and correlations of our measures in Table
2, Panel A, for Indian firms and Table 2, Panel B, for U.K.
firms. The tables show that age, size, R&D expenses, inter-
national growth in developed markets, and acquisitions in
developed markets are lower for Indian firms relative to
U.K. firms. This is consistent with extant literature, which
has argued that emerging-market firms are younger, smaller,
and less technologically advanced than their developed-
market counterparts, with less international growth and
fewer developed-market acquisitions (Wright et al. 2005).
We perform collinearity diagnostics by computing the vari-
ance inflation factors (VIFs) for all independent variables.
The VIF values range from 1.01 to 1.79 for India and from
1.00 to 1.63 for the United Kingdom. The correlation
matrix and the VIFs together indicate that multicollinearity
is likely absent from our data.
Tests of Hypotheses
Table 3 presents the results of the substantive models that
test our hypotheses for the Indian and U.K. samples. The
models use random-effects panel estimation with robust
standard errors. A Hausman test shows that the difference in
coefficients between the fixed- and random-effects estima-
tion is not systematic (p > .05) (Hausman 1978). A Breusch–
Pagan Lagrange Multiplier test shows that a random-effects
panel estimation is appropriate for our data (p < .05).
We perform a Chow (1960) test to compare the coeffi-
cients of the hypothesized variables for the Indian and U.K.
samples and determine whether they are different. The
Chow statistic is 1.61, which is greater than the critical F-
value, confirming that the coefficients of the Indian and
U.K. samples are different. We conduct an additional test to
show that the coefficients of the hypothesized variables are
different for India and the United Kingdom. First, we esti-
mate a model using the pooled Indian and U.K. data with
interaction terms. We create a dummy “IND” with a value
of 1 for the Indian firms and 0 for the U.K. firms in the
pooled data. We then add interaction terms between this
dummy and all the hypothesized and control variables to
Equation 3 and reestimate the equation. The results of the
estimation (see Table 3) show that these interactions are all
significant, confirming that the coefficients of the hypothe-
sized variables are significantly greater for India than for
the United Kingdom.
Indirect learning from leaders and international
growth. H1 predicts that emerging-market firms that learn
indirectly from their leaders’ developed-market experience
(LEADERIL) exhibit greater international growth than
other emerging-market firms. In support of H1, Table 3
shows that, for our Indian sample, the coefficient of LEAD-
ERIL is positive and significant (b1,IND = .04, p < .05). In
contrast, for the U.K. sample, the corresponding coefficient
is positive and nonsignificant (b1,UK = .04, p > .05). Fur-
thermore, the results from the pooled data show that the
interaction variable (IND ¥ LEADERIL) is positive and
significant (b = .09, p < .05) (see pooled India–United
Kingdom column in Table 3). Taken together, the results of
Table 3 suggest that indirect learning from the developed-
market experience of leaders plays a more important role in
the international growth of emerging-market relative to
developed-market firms.
Indirect learning from developed-market competitors and
international growth. H2a suggests that emerging-market
firms that have greater exposure to developed-market com-
petitors in their domestic market (DEVCOMPIL) will
exhibit greater international growth than other emerging-
market firms. The results for the Indian sample in Table 3
support H2a (b2,IND = .01, p < .05). By contrast, for the U.K.
sample, the corresponding coefficient is positive and non-
significant (b2,UK = .04, p > .05). Furthermore, the results
from the pooled data show that the interaction variable
(IND ¥ DEVCOMPIL) is positive and significant (b = .01,
p < .05) (see pooled India–United Kingdom column in
Table 3). Taken together, the results of Table 3 support our
claim that indirect learning from developed-market com-
petitors plays a more important role in the international
growth of emerging-market relative to developed-market
firms.
Indirect learning from domestic competitors and inter-
national growth. H2b states that emerging-market firms that
have domestic competitors with greater developed-market
experience (DOMCOMPIL) exhibit greater international
growth than other emerging-market firms. The results from
the Indian sample in Table 3 support H2b (b3,IND = .01, p <
.01). In contrast, for the U.K. sample, the corresponding
coefficient is nonsignificant (b3,UK = –3.93 ¥ 10–3, p > .05).
Furthermore, the results from the pooled data show that the
interaction variable (IND ¥ DOMCOMPIL) is positive and
significant (b = .02, p < .10) (see pooled India–United
Kingdom column in Table 3). Taken together, the results of
Table 3 support our argument that indirect learning from the
developed-market experience of domestic competitors
plays a more important role in the international growth of
emerging-market relative to developed-market firms.
Indirect learning from global competitors and interna-
tional growth. H2c predicts that emerging-market firms in
sectors with large global competitors (GLOBCOMPIL)
exhibit greater international growth than other emerging-
market firms. In support of H2c (see Table 3), the coefficient
of GLOBCOMPIL is positive and significant for the Indian
sample (b4, IND = .03, p < .05). In the U.K. sample, how-
ever, this coefficient is nonsignificant (b4, UK = –.03, p >
.05). Furthermore, the results from the pooled data show
that the interaction variable (IND ¥ GLOBCOMPIL) is
positive and significant (b = .04, p < .10) (see pooled India–
22 / Journal of Marketing, January 2015
TA
B
LE
 
2
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
St
at
is
tic
s 
an
d 
Co
rr
el
at
io
n
 
M
at
rix
A
: 
In
di
an
 
Fi
rm
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SD
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
in
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
ax
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
 
 
1.
 
G
R
O
W
D
EV
M
AR
K
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
09
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
56
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
2.
24
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8.
76
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
2.
 
LE
AD
ER
IL
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
76
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
06
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
3.
 
D
EV
CO
M
PI
L
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
17
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
78
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
10
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
4.
 
D
O
M
CO
M
PI
La
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
22
2.
52
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66
0.
16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,
00
4.
06
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
11
*
 
 
 
–
.
08
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
03
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
5.
 
G
LO
BC
O
M
PI
La
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4,
94
0.
37
 
 
 
18
,
63
0.
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.
79
 
 
 
23
3,
58
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
10
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
11
*
 
 
–
.
29
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
6.
 
N
ET
W
O
R
KI
La
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
90
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
38
6.
48
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2,
10
9.
19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
11
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
24
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
11
*
 
 
 
 
.
03
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
09
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
7.
 
AG
E 
(ye
a
rs
)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37
.
90
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24
.
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
26
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
04
 
 
 
–
.
25
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
19
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
28
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
8.
 
SI
ZE
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
25
9.
89
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
85
4.
34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
28
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18
,
80
2.
21
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
03
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
21
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
05
 
 
 
–
.
21
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
54
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
20
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
39
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
9.
 
R
&D
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
99
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
.
55
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16
4.
40
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
03
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
16
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
34
*
 
 
 
 
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
20
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
13
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
29
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
38
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
10
.
 
H
H
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
16
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
03
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
12
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
20
*
 
–
.
30
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
13
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
17
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
32
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
18
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
11
*
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
11
.
 
G
R
O
W
D
EV
M
AR
K i
t –
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
18
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
1.
39
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16
.
81
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
12
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
09
*
 
 
 
.
15
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
6.
40
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
05
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
–
.
13
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
12
.
 
G
R
O
W
EM
AR
K i
t –
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
09
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
28
 
 
 
 
 
–
12
.
47
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15
.
51
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
4.
50
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.
50
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
03
 
 
 
 
 
.
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
05
 
 
 
 
1.
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
04
 
 
 
 
–
.
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
13
.
 
AC
Q i
t –
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.
56
 
 
 
 
 
–
15
.
87
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
.
60
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
–
5.
30
 
 
 
 
4.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
04
 
 
 
 
–
.
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
80
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
03
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
B
: 
U.
K
.
 
Fi
rm
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SD
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
in
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
M
ax
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
 
 
1.
 
G
R
O
W
D
EV
M
AR
K
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
40
 
 
 
 
 
–
16
.
84
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
16
.
86
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
2.
 
LE
AD
ER
IL
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
06
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
51
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
3.
 
D
EV
CO
M
PI
L
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
12
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
94
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
11
*
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
4.
 
D
O
M
CO
M
PI
La
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
,
66
0.
72
 
 
 
43
,
88
5.
84
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29
5,
34
7
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
2.
60
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
16
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
11
*
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
 
 
5.
 
G
LO
BC
O
M
PI
La
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
27
,
32
5.
37
 
 
 
83
,
78
7.
11
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
74
2,
47
1.
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
14
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
08
*
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
6.
 
N
ET
W
O
R
KI
La
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13
3.
09
 
 
 
 
 
1,
18
1.
15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14
,
88
9.
76
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.
10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
08
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
05
 
 
 
 
 
.
09
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
14
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
 
 
7.
 
AG
E 
(ye
a
rs
)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
62
.
45
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52
.
09
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
09
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
05
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
07
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
20
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
8.
 
SI
ZE
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10
,
14
8.
15
 
 
 
37
,
52
7.
22
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
45
8,
36
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
11
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
09
*
 
 
 
 
.
08
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
56
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
12
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
26
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
9.
 
R
&D
a
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11
9.
60
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
63
6.
09
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6,
36
9.
18
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
3.
70
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
15
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
15
*
 
 
 
.
08
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
23
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
14
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
12
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
28
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
10
.
 
H
H
I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
28
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
19
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
08
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
03
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
13
*
 
 
 
 
–
.
35
*
 
–
.
13
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
19
*
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
07
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
06
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
18
*
 
 
 
 
1.
00
11
.
 
G
R
O
W
D
EV
M
AR
K i
t –
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
31
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
55
 
 
 
 
 
–
16
.
78
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
19
.
14
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
14
*
 
 
 
 
3.
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
–
2.
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
–
1.
80
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
8.
90
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥
10
–
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
12
.
 
G
R
O
W
EM
AR
K i
t –
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
26
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.
09
 
 
 
 
 
–
16
.
95
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
17
.
73
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
3.
70
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
4.
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
05
 
 
–
4.
60
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
07
*
 
 
–
6.
6 
 
 
 
 
 
–
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
06
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
¥1
0–
4
13
.
 
AC
Q i
t –
 
2
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
30
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
7.
38
 
 
 
 
 
–
20
.
04
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
20
.
42
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
03
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
–
.
01
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
4.
50
 
 
–
6.
20
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
02
 
 
 
 
7.
20
 
 
 
 
 
 
–
.
02
 
 
 
 
 
 
.
03
 
 
 
 
1.
00
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
¥1
0–
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
¥1
0–
3
*
p
<
 
.
05
.
a
Va
lu
e
s 
in
 
m
illi
o
n
s 
o
f U
.
S.
 
do
lla
rs
.
N
o
te
s:
 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f I
n
di
a
n
 
fir
m
s 
=
 
11
6;
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f I
n
di
a
n
 
fir
m
 
o
bs
e
rv
a
tio
n
s 
=
 
61
1.
 
N
u
m
be
r 
o
f U
.
K.
 
fir
m
s 
=
 
16
0;
 
n
u
m
be
r 
o
f U
.
K.
 
fir
m
 
o
bs
e
rv
a
tio
n
s 
=
 
73
6.
Indirect Learning / 23
United Kingdom column in Table 3). Taken together, the
results of Table 3 support our argument that indirect learn-
ing from global competitors plays a more important role in
the international growth of emerging-market relative to
developed-market firms.
Indirect learning from networks and international
growth. H3 predicts that emerging-market firms that have
network members (NETWORKIL) with greater developed-
market experience exhibit greater international growth than
other emerging-market firms. In support of H3, we find that
TABLE 3
The Impact of Indirect Learning from Leaders, Competitors, and Networks on the International Growth of
Indian and UK Firms
                                                         Base Model          Full Model          Base Model          Full Model        Pooled India–
                                                              India                    India           United Kingdom  United Kingdom  United Kingdom
LEADERIL (H1)                                                                .04**                                                 .04                      –.05
                                                                                       (.02)                                                  (.13)                       (.05)
DEVCOMPIL (H2a)                                                           .01**                                                  .04                     –4.49 ¥ 10–3
                                                                                     (7.93 ¥ 10–3)                                      (.09)                    (9.26 ¥ 10–3)
DOMCOMPIL (H2b)                                                          .01***                                             –3.93 ¥ 10–3               –.02
                                                                                     (4.18 ¥ 10–3)                                      (.01)                      (.01)
GLOBCOMIL (H2c)                                                           .03**                                               –.03                      –.02 
                                                                                       (.02)                                                  (.04)                       (.03)
NETWORKIL (H3)                                                            .02**                                                –.02                     –8.33 ¥ 10–3
                                                                                     (7.58 ¥ 10–3)                                      (.02)                    (7.69 ¥ 10–3)
AGE                                                  –3.07 ¥ 10–3         –.04                     –.29***                 –.30***                  –.10*
                                                           (.03)                    (.03)                      (.13)                      (.13)                       (.07)
SIZE                                                 –2.42 ¥ 10–3         –.02                       .03                       .05                        .04 
                                                           (.02)                    (.02)                      (.07)                      (.06)                       (.04)
R&D                                                  –6.57 ¥ 10–3         –9.46 ¥ 10–3*       –2.67 ¥ 10–4**      –2.67 ¥ 10–4**         8.72 ¥ 10–3
                                                         (5.90 ¥ 10–3)       (7.01 ¥ 10–3)       (1.46 ¥ 10–4)        (1.56 ¥ 10–4)        (7.90 ¥ 10–3)
HHI                                                     –.08*                   –.09*                      .86**                  1.02**                      .02 
                                                           (.05)                    (.06)                      (.45)                      (.56)                       (.07)
GROWDEVMARKit – 2                                  .04                      .04                       .12**                    .12**                      .02 
                                                           (.05)                    (.05)                      (.06)                      (.06)                       (.02)
GOWREMARKit – 2                                    –2.26 ¥ 10–4       –2.44 ¥ 10–3              –.01                      –.01                     –2.15 ¥ 10–3
                                                                             (2.21 ¥ 10–3)       (2.78 ¥ 10–3)         (.01)                    (.01)                    (3.31 ¥ 10–3)
ACQit – 2                                                          –1.57 ¥ 10–3       –2.41 ¥ 10–3        –7.13 ¥ 10–3           –7.01 ¥ 10–3               2.99 ¥ 10–3
                                                                             (4.53 ¥ 10–3)       (4.45 ¥ 10–3)        (9.53 ¥ 10–3)        (9.63 ¥ 10–3)        (3.60 ¥ 10–3)
IND ¥ LEADERIL                                                                                                                                                    .09**
                                                                                                                                                                               (.05)
IND ¥ DEVCOMPIL                                                                                                                                                 .01**
                                                                                                                                                                               (.01)
IND ¥ DOMCOMPIL                                                                                                                                                .02*
                                                                                                                                                                               (.01)
IND ¥ GLOBCOMPIL                                                                                                                                              .04*
                                                                                                                                                                               (.03)
IND ¥ NETWORKIL                                                                                                                                                .02**
                                                                                                                                                                             (9.43 ¥ 10–3)
IND                                                                                                                                                                        –.22 
                                                                                                                                                                               (.35)
IND ¥ GROWDEVMARKit – 2                                                                                                                               –4.82 ¥ 10–3
                                                                                                                                                                               (.04)
Inverse Mills ratio                                 .05                      .15                     –.10                     –.13                        .02 
                                                           (.12)                    (.12)                      (.51)                      (.54)                       (.10)
Intercept                                             –.17                      .04                     2.47***                 3.96**                      .38 
                                                           (.24)                    (.22)                      (.94)                    (1.48)                       (.34)
Firms                                                     116                       116                       160                       160                       276
N                                                           611                       611                       736                       736                    1,347
R2                                                                            .09                       .13                        .05                        .05                         .05
*p < .10.
**p < .05.
***p < .01.
the coefficient of NETWORKIL for the Indian sample is
positive and significant (b5, IND = .02, p < .05). In our U.K.
sample, however, the coefficient of NETWORKIL is non-
significant (b5, UK = –.02, p > .05). Furthermore, the results
from the pooled data show that the interaction variable
(IND ¥ NETWORKIL) is positive and significant (b = .02,
p < .05) (see Table 3). Taken together, the results support
our argument that indirect learning from network members’
developed-market experience plays a more important role
in the international growth of emerging-market relative to
developed-market firms.
Controls. One of our controls is learning from past
international growth in developed markets (GROWDEV-
MARKit – 2). In our Indian sample (see Table 3), we do not
find a significant effect for this variable on international
growth (bIND = .04, p > .05). In our U.K. sample, however,
we find a significant effect of direct learning from past
international growth in developed markets (bUK = .12, p <
.05). These results suggest that direct learning (i.e., past
international growth in developed markets) is more impor-
tant for developed-market than for emerging-market firms.
Our controls for learning from past international growth in
emerging markets (GROWEMARKit – 2) and learning from
cross-border acquisitions in developed markets (ACQit – 2)
are not significant for either the Indian or U.K. firms.
Additional Analyses and Robustness Checks
Can we rule out heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion? To rule out heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we
reestimate the models in Table 3 with Driscoll and Kraay
(1998) standard errors estimation. Our results in Table 3
hold for this estimation. We conduct further robustness
checks by reestimating our models with feasible general-
ized least squares. Our results hold for these estimations as
well.
Are our results robust to alternate measures of interna-
tional growth? We reestimate Equations 3 and 4 on the
Indian, U.K., and pooled data using log-transformed reve-
nues in developed markets as an alternate dependent variable
(rather than growth, our primary dependent variable, which
uses the first difference of log-transformed revenues in
developed markets). For this alternate measure, each of our
hypothesized effects holds for the Indian sample but not for
the U.K. sample. We also find that the interaction terms
between the dummy (India) and hypothesized variables are
positive and significant (p < .10) in the pooled data.
Are our results robust to alternate estimation methods?
It can be argued that our dependent variable in Equation 3
measures change (i.e., growth) through a first difference of
log-transformed developed-market revenues, whereas our
hypothesized variables measure level (i.e., they do not mea-
sure change in the measures of leaders, competitors, or net-
works). To alleviate any concerns about this inconsistency
between the dependent and hypothesized variables, we con-
duct a Blundell–Bond (1998) estimation with first-differenced
dependent and hypothesized variables. The results of this
estimation show that for each of the hypothesized effects,
our results hold for the Indian sample but not for the U.K.
sample. In addition, the results of this estimation for our
interaction model with pooled data also show that our
hypothesized variables drive the international growth of
emerging-market firms but do not drive the international
growth of developed-market firms.
Comparison of hypothesized effects within samples. To
compare the hypothesized effects within samples, we stan-
dardize all variables in Equation 3 across firms and reesti-
mate our models. We find that the coefficients of the
hypothesized variables in the Indian sample are positive
and significant (p < .05), whereas those in the U.K. sample
are nonsignificant (p > .05). In the Indian sample, the size
of each coefficient represents its relative importance in the
regression. Accordingly, we find that the coefficients of the
hypothesized indirect learning variables, in decreasing
order of importance, are networks (.10), domestic competi-
tors (.09), foreign competitors (.07), global competitors
(.05), and leaders (.04).
Marginal effects of hypothesized variables. The results
for the Indian sample show that a one-standard-deviation
increase in indirect learning from leaders results in a 2.24%
(i.e., .04 ¥ standard deviation) increase in growth in devel-
oped market revenues. The increase in developed-market
revenues is presented as a percentage change because our
dependent variable (first difference of log-transformed
developed-market revenues) is an approximation for per-
centage change. Similarly, a one-standard-deviation increase
in indirect learning from foreign competitors, domestic
competitors, and global competitors results in a 3.92% (.07 ¥
standard deviation), 5.04% (i.e., .09 ¥ standard deviation),
and 2.80% (.05 ¥ standard deviation) increase in growth in
developed-market revenues, respectively. Finally, our stan-
dardized regression results suggest that a one-standard-
deviation increase in indirect learning from networks results
in a 5.60% (.10 ¥ standard deviation) increase in growth in
developed-market revenues.
Summary and Discussion
Many scholars have noted that the question of how firms
grow is one of the most important facing the marketing dis-
cipline (Bharadwaj, Varadarajan, and Fahy 1993; Srivastava,
Shervani, and Fahey 1998). As firms look overseas for new
sources of growth, the international aspects of such growth
take on critical importance (Steenkamp 2005). We con-
tribute to the marketing literature by proposing and testing
an explanation for international growth anchored around
organizational learning— specifically, indirect learning
about markets. We argue that in contrast to developed-mar-
ket firms, which learn directly from their own experience,
emerging-market firms learn indirectly about how to com-
pete in developed markets by acquiring this knowledge
from leaders, competitors, and network members. Next, we
discuss the implications of these findings for research and
practice.
Implications for Research
This article has several implications for research. First, to
the best of our knowledge, this is the first article in market-
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ing to systematically study the international growth of
emerging-market firms. In doing so, it demonstrates the
opportunities that exist in studying emerging markets more
generally. Despite calls to study the international growth of
emerging-market firms from several sources—scholars and
journal editors, research organizations such as the Market-
ing Science Institute, business periodicals such as The
Economist and BusinessWeek, and management consultan-
cies such as Boston Consulting Group—such studies are
rare in the marketing literature. By offering new, empiri-
cally based insights on well-studied topics such as market
growth as well as on understudied topics such as the role of
indirect learning, we hope that this article will serve as an
initial basis for further research into the dynamic and
important yet poorly understood phenomenon of the inter-
national growth of emerging-market firms.
Second, this research highlights the notion that theories
from developed-market contexts do not easily transfer
across the boundaries from developed to emerging markets.
This is because the stage and pattern of business evolution
is different in emerging markets, as are the institutional con-
texts that pervade such markets. For example, emerging-
market firms often lack knowledge of how to compete in
developed markets and do not have the luxury of learning
over time from their own direct experience in developed
markets. We show that emerging-market firms overcome
this lack of knowledge and time by employing alternative,
indirect ways of learning that are more suited to their spe-
cific contexts than the more direct methods of learning
highlighted in the existing literature. This suggests that
researchers should use caution when applying existing
developed-market frameworks to emerging-market con-
texts. Therefore, we echo editors of marketing journals who
have urged scholars to study the international aspects of
marketing topics (Bolton 2003; Steenkamp 2005) and to
use emerging markets as laboratories in which to test and
modify assumptions and theories developed in and for the
Western world (Burgess and Steenkamp 2006). More gener-
ally, by exploring alternative ways in which firms learn
about new markets, this article contributes to broader mar-
keting research on organizational learning (Sinkula 1994)
as well as research regarding how firms gather, disseminate,
and respond to information about competitors (Kohli and
Jaworski 1990). Given that the study of competitors is an
integral part of marketing (Dickson 1992; Lambkin and
Day 1989), our focus on how firms learn through and about
competitors enables us to contribute to a significant stream
of research in marketing.
Third, little existing research has been able to address
methodological problems such as endogeneity in testing
theories about international growth (Herrmann and Datta
2005; Reeb, Sakakibara, and Mahmood 2012). In contrast,
we employ an empirical strategy that takes advantage of the
pace and timing with which regulatory restrictions were
removed in emerging markets. Specifically, we use a recent
regulatory shock to address the problem of endogeneity in
our study of the international growth of Indian firms. Future
researchers could use similar exogenous shocks to rigor-
ously estimate the effects they aim to study.
Fourth, most research on business groups has empha-
sized their role in mitigating the downside of operating in
emerging markets. The focus is typically on how business
groups help emerging-market firms overcome the institu-
tional voids they face by lowering the transaction costs
these voids create (Khanna and Palepu 2000). By contrast,
we highlight the upside potential of business groups in
growing globally. We show that business groups can help
increase the competitiveness of member firms in interna-
tional markets by enabling the sharing of information
among member firms, fostering learning from the activities
of member firms, and leveraging the scale and scope of the
business group for growth.
Implications for Practice
Implications for policy makers. The international growth
of emerging-market firms benefits emerging economies by
improving their balance of trade, increasing foreign exchange
reserves, and strengthening the home currency. These bene-
fits suggest several implications of our findings for policy
makers. First, policy makers in emerging economies often
believe that allowing citizens to study and work in devel-
oped markets results in “brain drain” and is thus to be dis-
couraged. Exit restrictions and emigration controls have
been mooted as potential policy instruments. For example,
(Sriskandarajah 2005) states, “That something needs to be
done about brain drain is not in question. G8 leaders have
discussed the issue, the UK’s Commission on Africa calls
for better responses, and unions, development agencies, and
other civil-society groups are demanding action.” Our find-
ings, however, suggest that there can be benefits to allow-
ing, and even encouraging, citizens from emerging
economies to study and work in developed markets.
Specifically, we show that citizens with education and work
experience from developed markets offer emerging-market
firms access to a pool of leaders with developed-market
knowledge from whom these firms can learn and who can
drive their growth in developed markets. Accordingly, we
argue that policy makers in emerging economies should be
careful about placing obstacles in the paths of their citizens
who try to study or work in developed markets. Indeed,
they might even encourage their citizens to study in devel-
oped markets, for example, by providing them with scholar-
ships, increasing the availability of loans, and removing for-
eign exchange restrictions on spending in developed
markets.
Second, policy makers in emerging economies often
succumb to the demands of business leaders to raise barriers
to protect domestic firms from developed-market competi-
tors. For example, after reforms in 1991 opened up Indian
markets to developed-market competitors, several business
leaders formed a group (known as the Bombay Club) to
lobby policy makers to raise barriers to developed market
competition. As Gurcharan Das, a noted Indian business
commentator, states, “Reforms have been painfully slow
precisely because of arguments ... espoused by the Bombay
Club and others” (Singh 2011). Our findings suggest that
emerging-market firms have much to gain from opening up
to developed-market competition and that policy makers in
emerging markets should not bow to the demands of
domestic business leaders to keep protectionist barriers high.
Specifically, our findings suggest that (in addition to
other potential benefits) greater developed-market competi-
tion helps emerging-market firms learn about developed
markets and pursue international growth. Accordingly, we
argue that policy makers should encourage the entry of
developed-market firms and stimulate ways in which
domestic firms can learn from developed-market entrants.
They can achieve the latter by encouraging the formation of
alliances; by stimulating the formation of trade associations
that unite domestic and foreign firms; by organizing inter-
national trade shows in which domestic firms interact with
developed-market firms; and by creating information reposi-
tories that collect, analyze, and disseminate information on
the activities of developed-market firms.
Implications for emerging-market firms. Recruitment in
emerging-market firms often focuses on (1) hiring large
numbers of young graduates from home universities (with
no international education or experience) and (2) develop-
ing this internal talent pool from which to draw future top
managers. As a recent Ernst & Young (2012, p. 11) report
states, “Entry-level hiring is characterized by large volumes
with a focus on quick turnaround time rather than on quality
hiring.” Consequently, emerging-market firms are unable to
access the talent of outside recruits with education and work
experience from developed markets. Our findings suggest
that human resource managers in emerging-market firms
must develop capabilities in lateral recruitment, which
would enable them to gain access to managers with educa-
tion and experience in developed markets at the middle-
management level. Doing so would create an internal pool
of managers with developed-market experience who could
eventually lead these firms. In this way, emerging-market
firms would be better poised to learn how to compete in
developed markets, which would, in turn, increase their
ability to grow globally.
Second, a widely held belief among managers is that
firms in business groups perform better in closed economic
regimes but lose out in more liberal ones (Khanna and
Palepu 2000). In contrast, our findings from postliberaliza-
tion India suggest that firms in business groups experience
greater global growth, even in liberal economic regimes,
than nonaffiliated firms do. This is because firms in busi-
ness groups can share informational resources with one
another and thus can learn how to compete in developed
markets from member firms with such experience. Our
results suggest that business groups should strengthen the
information-sharing mechanisms between member firms as
a means to pursue greater international growth. Our results
also suggest that firms not affiliated with business groups
should become members of industry consortia, which could
enable them to share such informational resources and
learning to grow globally.
Implications for developed-market firms. At various
points in recent history, executives in developed-market
firms have believed that emerging-market firms cannot
compete with them in international markets (Wright et al.
2005). Even if they are aware of the competitiveness of
emerging-market firms, they might not be able to easily
identify which emerging-market firms are likely to be the
most competitive. By contrast, our findings show that some
emerging-market firms are as competitive as developed-
market firms and also indicate ways to identify these firms.
Specifically, developed-market firms can identify the most
competitive emerging-market firms by determining whether
they (1) have leaders with developed-market educational 
or work experience, (2) operate in industries with many
developed-market competitors, (3) have domestic competi-
tors with experience in developed markets, and (4) have
network members with international experience. This
implies that not all emerging-market firms will be as
competitive as developed-market firms; however, firms that
can learn indirectly about how to compete in international
markets are especially likely to pose serious threats to their
developed-market counterparts.
Limitations and Further Research
This article has several limitations, some of which offer
opportunities for further research. First, although our theo-
rizing is general in scope over emerging markets and pro-
vides a comparison with developed markets, our empirical
context is limited to a single emerging-market country,
India, and a single developed-market country, the United
Kingdom. Additional research using data from other emerg-
ing and developed markets would be valuable in exploring
the generalizability of our findings. Second, we use two
measures of international growth: year-on-year change in
developed-market revenues and annual developed-market
revenues. These measures undoubtedly pick up important
aspects of firms’ international growth. Nevertheless, future
researchers might fruitfully employ additional multi-item
measures of international growth. We also restrict ourselves
to measuring overall annual revenues (i.e., we estimate a
firm-year model) instead of country-specific annual reve-
nues (i.e., estimating a firm–destination country–year
model) because the latter would answer a different research
question: Why does the revenue growth of an emerging-
market firm vary across different developed markets?
Because the research question of this article (“Why do
some emerging market firms achieve more revenue growth
in developed markets than others?”) is itself an important
one that had not yet been addressed, we restricted our focus
to answering this question. Future researchers could pro-
vide valuable insights by collecting country-specific annual
revenues to implement the firm–destination country–year
model and answer the former research question. Third, we
examine only some measures of indirect learning (albeit
important ones) from leaders, competitors, and networks.
More fine-grained measures of these three drivers (and oth-
ers) might provide additional insights. Further research
could therefore examine the effects of, among others, the
country of the CEO’s international educational or work
experience, the board members’ educational and profes-
sional networks, the education and work experience of local
talent from host countries, the extent of international expan-
sion by domestic competitors in developed markets (e.g.,
the number of international sales personnel or sales offices
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in developed markets), the extent of marketing activities in
which developed-market competitors engage in domestic
markets, the extent of global industry concentration in dif-
ferent regions of the world, and the role of cost-based
strategies relative to differentiation strategies for interna-
tional growth.
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